We adopt a systemic risk indicator measured by the price of insurance against systemic financial distress and assess individual banks' marginal contributions to the systemic risk. The methodology is applied to the 19 bank holding companies covered by the US Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), with the systemic risk indicator peaking around 1.1 trillion USD in March 2009. Our systemic risk contribution measure shows interesting similarity and divergence with the SCAP expected loss measure. In general, we find that bank's contribution to the systemic risk is roughly linear in its default probability, but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation. 
The recent global financial crisis has led bank supervisors and regulators to rethink about the rationale of banking regulation. One important lesson is that, the traditional approach to assuring the soundness of individual banks, as in Basel I and Basel II, needs to be supplemented by a system-wide macroprudential approach. The macroprudential perspective of supervision focuses on the soundness of the banking system as a whole and the inter-linkages among those systemically important banks. This has become an overwhelming theme in the policy deliberations among legislative committees, bank regulators, and academic researchers.
1 As stated in the Financial Stability Board's interim report in June 2010, "Financial institutions should be subject to requirements commensurate with the risks they pose to the financial system."
However, to implement such a macroprudential perspective in practice is not an easy task.
The operational framework needs to provide answers to three crucial questions. First, how to measure the systemic risk in a financial system? Second, how to measure the contributions of individual banks (or financial institutions) to the systemic risk? Third, how to design prudential requirements on individual banks, such as capital surcharge, tax or fee for a financial stability fund, that are connected with their systemic risk contributions?
Against such a background, this paper proposes a consistent framework that provides direct answers to the first two questions, and the results of which can be used as useful inputs to address the above third question. Our systemic risk measure can be interpreted economically as the insurance premium to cover distressed losses in a banking system, which is a concept of risk-neutral market price if such an insurance market were to exist and to function properly (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009) . Within the same framework, the systemic importance of each bank (or bank group) can be properly defined as its marginal contribution to the hypothetical distress insurance premium of the whole banking system. This approach allows us to study the time variation and cross section of the systemic risk contributions of US large and complex financial institutions (LCFIs).
There are advantages in adopting such a consistent approach. Under such a framework, the marginal contribution of each bank adds up to the aggregate systemic risk. As shown in Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009a) , this additivity property is desirable from an operational perspective, because it allows the macroprudential tools to be implemented at individual bank levels. In particular, prudential requirements can be a linear transformation of the marginal contribution measures if the latter is additive. One can also decompose our systemic risk measures into different economic channels-e.g., risk premium versus actual default risk, credit risk versus liquidity risk. Finally, since our structural framework uses default probabilities, liability size, and correlations directly as inputs to capture the well publicized characteristics of systemic risk -leverage, too-big-to-fail, and too-connected-tofail; one can easily swap these inputs with supervisory confidential information for practical policy analysis.
We apply this approach to the 19 bank holding companies bution to the systemic risk indicator appears to be linearly related to its default probability, but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset correlation. We find that the increase in systemic risk of the US banking sector during the 2007-2009 financial crisis was initially mainly driven by heightened default risk premium and liquidity risk premium, and latter by the deterioration in actual default risk.
More importantly, we can rank order the systemic importance of large and complex financial institutions in the US banking sector. Among the notable largest contributors based on our measure, Bank of America and Wells Fargo are increasing their systemic risk contributions, CitiGroup remains the largest contributor over time, and JPMorgan Chase is decreasing its marginal contribution. It seems that the relative contributions to systemic risk from both consumer banks and regional banks are increasing somewhat recently, possibly due to the worsening situations in commercial real estate and consumer credit sectors that are typically lagging the business cycles. Overall, our analysis suggests that size is the dominant factor in determining the relative importance of each bank's systemic risk contribution, but size doesn't change significantly overtime, at least within a reporting quarter. The obvious time-variation in the marginal contributions are mostly driven by the risk-neutral default probability and equity return correlation. In essence, the systemic importance of each institution is jointly determined by size, default probability, and asset correlation of all institutions in the portfolio. Congress, 2010) imposes a limit on a bank's size, which is known as Volcker concentration limit and aims at containing the systemic risk of individual banks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology.
Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 presents empirical results based on an illustrative banking system that consists of 19 large and complex financial institutions (LCFI) in US.
The last section concludes.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology used in this paper. The first part constructs a market-based systemic risk indicator for a heterogeneous portfolio of financial institutions, and the second part designs a measure to assess the contribution of each bank (or each group of banks) to the systemic risk indicator.
Constructing the Systemic Risk Indicator
To construct a systemic risk indicator of a heterogeneous banking portfolio, we follow the structural approach of Vasicek (1991) for pricing the portfolio credit risk, which is also consistent with the Merton (1974) model for individual firm default. The systemic risk indicator, a hypothetical insurance premium against catastrophic losses in a banking system, is constructed from real-time financial market data (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009 ). The two key default risk factors, the probability of default (PD) of individual banks and the asset return correlations among banks, are estimated from credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity price co-movements, respectively.
Risk-Neural Default Probability
The PD measure used in this approach is derived from single-name CDS spreads. A CDS contract offers protection against default losses of an underlying entity; in return, the protection buyer agrees to make constant periodic premium payments. The CDS market has grown rapidly in recent years, and the CDS spread is considered to be a superior measure of credit risk to bond spreads or loan spreads.
2 The spread of a T -year CDS contract is given by
where R i,t is the recovery rate, r t is the default-free interest rate, and q i,t is the risk-neutral default intensity. The banks are indexed by i = 1, · · · , N . The above characterization assumes that recovery risk is independent of interest rate and default risks.
Under the simplifying assumptions of flat term structure of risk-free rate and flat default intensity term structure, the one-year risk-neutral PDs of individual banks can be derived from CDS spreads, as in Duffie (1999) and Tarashev and Zhu (2008a) :
where a t ≡ t+T t e −rtτ dτ , b t ≡ t+T t τ e −rtτ dτ , and LGD i,t = (1−R i,t ) is the loss-given-default.
There are three elements in the implied PD estimated from the CDS market: (1) the compensation for expected default losses; (2) default risk premium for bearing the default risk; (3) other premium components, e.g., liquidity or uncertainty risk compensations. Our systemic risk indicator incorporates the combined effects of the above three elements on the price of insurance against distressed losses in the banking system.
One extension in this study is that we allow for the LGD to vary, rather than assuming it to be a constant, 3 over time. For example, Altman and Kishore (1996) showed that LGD can vary over the credit cycle. To reflect the comovement in PD and LGD parameters, we choose to use expected LGDs as reported by market participants who price and trade the CDS contracts.
Asset Return Correlation
Systemic risk in a financial sector is in essence a joint default event of multiple large institutions, which is captured by the correlations of observable equity returns (Nicolò and Kwast, 2002 ). At a more fundamental level, such a correlation structure may be driven by the common movements in underlying firms' asset dynamics (Vasicek, 1991) . We measure the asset return correlation by the equity return correlation (Hull and White, 2004) , as equity is the most liquid financial market and can incorporate new information on an institution's default risk in a timely way. The standard approach is to use the so-called historical correlation, which is based on the past one year of daily return data.
Let ρ i,j denotes the correlation between banks' asset returns A i,t and A j,t , which is approximated by the correlation between banks' equity returns, with i and j ∈ {1, · · · , N } and N as the number of banks. To ensure the internal consistency of correlation estimates, we assume that asset returns are underpinned by F common factors
N idiosyncratic factors Z i,t (Gordy, 2003) :
where
] is the vector of common factor loadings,
Without loss of generality, all common and idiosyncratic factors are assumed to be mutually independent and to have zero means and unit variances.
We estimate the loading coefficients β i,f (i = 1, · · · , N , f = 1, · · · , F ) by minimizing the mean squared difference between the target correlations and the factor-driven correlations:
In practice, three common factors can explain up to 95 percent of the total variation in our correlation sample estimates. More importantly, besides the "zero mean-unit variance" normalization, this estimation method imposes no restriction on the distribution of the common and idiosyncratic factors.
Hypothetical Distress Insurance Premium
Based on the inputs of the key credit risk parameters -PDs, LGDs, correlations, and liability weights -the systemic risk indicator can be calculated by simulation as described in Gibson (2004) ; Hull and White (2004) ; Tarashev and Zhu (2008b) . In short, to compute the indicator, we first construct a hypothetical debt portfolio that consists of total liabilities (deposits, debts and others) of all banks. The indicator of systemic risk, effectively weighted by the liability size of each bank, is defined as the insurance premium that protects against distressed losses of this portfolio. Technically, it is calculated as the risk-neutral expectation of portfolio credit losses that equal or exceed a minimum share of the sector's total liabilities.
To be more specific, let L i denote the loss of bank i's liability with i = 1, · · · , N ; and
L i is the total loss of the portfolio. Then the systemic risk of the banking sector or the distress insurance premium (DIP) is given by the risk-neutral expectation of the loss exceeding certain threshold level:
where L min is a minimum loss threshold or "deductible" value. The DIP formula can be easily implemented with Monte Carlo simulation (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009 ).
the concept of expected shortfall (ES) used in the literature (see, e.g., Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010) , in that both refer to the conditional expectations of portfolio credit losses under extreme conditions. They differ slightly in the sense that the extreme condition is defined by the percentile distribution in the case of ES but by a given threshold loss of underlying portfolio in the case of DIP. Also the probabilities in the tail event underpinning ES are normalized to sum up to one. These probabilities are not normalized for DIP. The value-at-risk measure or VaR -extended by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) into CoVaR -is also based on the percentile distribution, but as shown by Inui and Kijima (2005) , Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) , and Embrechts, Lambrigger, and Wüthrich (2009), ES is a coherent measure of risk while VaR is not. 
Identifying Systemically Important Banks
For the purpose of macroprudential regulation, it is important not only to monitor the level of systemic risk for banking sector, but also to understand the sources of risks in a financial system, i.e., to measure the marginal contributions of each institutions. This information is especially useful considering the reform effort of the financial regulations across the globe, with the main objective of charging additional capital for systemically important banks and support a resolution regime for these banks. In the following, we propose a method to decompose the credit risk of the portfolio into the sources of risk contributors associated with individual sub-portfolios (either a bank or a group of banks).
Following Kurth and Tasche (2003) and Glasserman (2005) , for standard measures of risk, including value-at-risk (VaR), expected shortfall (ES), and distress insurance premium (DIP) used in this study, the total risk can be usefully decomposed into a sum of marginal risk contributions. Each marginal risk contribution is the conditional expected loss from that sub-portfolio, conditional on a large loss for the full portfolio. In particular, if we define L as the loss variable for the whole portfolio, and L i as the loss variable for a sub-portfolio, the marginal contribution to our systemic risk indicator, the distress insurance premium (DIP), can be characterized by
The additive property of the decomposition results, i.e., the systemic risk of a portfolio equals the marginal contribution from each sub-portfolio, is extremely important from an operational perspective. Whereas the macroprudential approach focuses on the risk of the financial system as a whole, in the end regulatory and policy measures are introduced at the level of individual banks. Our approach, therefore, allows a systemic risk regulator to easily link the regulatory capital assessment with risk contributions from each institution.
A technical difficulty is that systemic distresses are rare events and thus ordinary Monte
Carlo estimation is impractical for the calculation purpose. Therefore, we rely on the importance sampling method developed by Glassmerman and Li (2005) for simulating portfolio credit losses to improve the efficiency and precision. For the nineteen-bank portfolio in our sample, we use the mean-shifting method and generate 200,000 importance-sampling simulations of default scenarios (default or not), 6 and for each scenario generate 100 simulations of
LGDs. 7 Based on these simulation results we calculate the expected loss of each sub-portfolio conditional on total loss exceeding a given threshold.
Alternative Approaches
There is a rapidly growing literature on systemic risk measurement and management, some are focusing on the interaction between macroeconomy and financial sector (see, e.g., Nicolò
and Lucchetta, 2010) and others on financial sector default risk (see, e.g., Kim and Giesecke, 2010) . There are three approaches closely related to ours in terms of focusing on identifying systemically important institutions and charging additional capital based on banks' marginal contributions.
8
The most closely related approach is the CoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) . CoVaR looks at the VaR of the whole portfolio conditional on the VaR of an individual institution, defined implicitly as
where the expectation is taken under the objective measure. In other words, the focus of CoVaR is to examine the spillover or correlation effect from one bank's failure to the whole system but underplays the importance of institutional size by design. By comparison, our definition of distress insurance premium (DIP) is along the same line but focuses on the loss of a particular bank (or a bank group) conditional on the system being in distress. 9 Nevertheless, a major disadvantage of CoVaR is that it can only be used to identify systemically important institutions but cannot appropriately aggregate the systemic risk contributions of individual institutions.
10
Another alternative is the marginal expected shortfall (MES) proposed by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) . MES looks at the expected loss of each bank conditional on the whole portfolio of banks performing poorly
where the expectation is taken under the objective measure. Again, in comparison, the MES is similar to our distress insurance premium (DIP) measure in that both focus on each bank's potential loss conditional on the system being in distress exceeding a threshold level, and both are coherent risk measures. They differ slightly in the sense that the extreme condition is defined by the percentile distribution in the MES setting but by a given threshold loss of underlying portfolio in the case of DIP. Also the probabilities in the tail event underpinning
MES are normalized to sum up to one. These probabilities are not normalized for DIP. The more important difference is that the MES is calculated based on equity return data, while our DIP measure is mainly based on the CDS data. Compared with equity return data, CDS data are better and purer sources of default risk information.
A third alternative is the "Shapley value" decomposition approach by Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009a,b) , which focuses on how to allocate among individual institutions any appropriately defined notion of systemic risk. The "Shapley value" approach, constructed in game theory, defined the contribution of each bank as a weighted average of its add-on effect to each subsystem that consists of this bank. The Shapley value approach derives systemic importance at a different level from our approach. Under its general application, the Shapley value approach tends to suffers from the curse of dimensionality problem in that, for a system of N banks, there are 2 N possible subsystem for which the systemic risk indicator needs to be calculated. 11 However, the Shapley value approach has the same desirable additivity property and therefore can be used as a general approach to allocating systemic risk.
Data
We applied the methodology outlined above to the 19 bank holding companies can differ substantially from the ex post observations of a handful default events during our sample period. In addition, whereas we allow for time-varying recovery rates, they exhibit only small variation (between 33 and 40 percent) during the sample period.
13

Empirical Findings
We apply the methodology described in Section 2 and examine the systemic risk in the US banking system that consists of nineteen banks covered by Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), or commonly known as "stress test". Using these banks as an example, we first report the systemic risk indicator for these institutions as a group and then analyse the systemic importance of individual banks.
Our findings suggest that the systemic risk indicator stood at its peak around 1.1 trillion USD in March 2009 and has since fallen to about 300 billion USD-the level reached in 13 The original recovery rate data have a significant sparseness problem, in that a large portion of CDS quotes come without the corresponding recovery rates. Therefore, in this paper we use the HP-filtered recovery rates to reflect the time variation in recovery rates, and at the same time to avoid noisy movements in average recovery rates due to data reporting problems.
to its default probability, but highly nonlinear with respect to institution size and asset percent of the variation in the distress insurance premium. On average, a one-percentagepoint increase in average PD raises the distress insurance premium by 1.7 percent. The level of correlation also matters, but to a lesser degree and its impact is largely washed out once PD is included. This is perhaps due to the strong relationship between PD and correlation for the sample banking group during this special time period. In addition, the recovery rate has the expected negative sign in the regression, as higher recovery rates reduce the ultimate losses for a given default scenario. Interestingly, the dispersion in PDs across the 19 banks has a significantly negative effect on the systemic risk indicator.
Systemic Risk Indicator
14 This partly supports our view that incorporating heterogeneity in PDs is important in measuring the system risk indicator.
15
The results have two important implications for supervisors. First, given the predominant role of average PDs in determining the systemic risk, a first-order approximation of the systemic risk indicator could use the weighted average of PDs (or CDS spreads). This can be confirmed by comparing the similar trend in average PDs (the upper panel in Figure 1) and the distress insurance premium (Figure 2) . Second, the average PD itself is only a good approximation but is not sufficient in reflecting the intricate nonlinear relationship between systemic risk indicator and its input variables. Correlations and heterogeneity in PD also matter. In other words, diversification can reduce the systemic risk.
Risk Premium Decomposition
As mentioned in Section 2, the PDs implied from CDS spreads are a risk-neutral measure and include information not only on expected actual default losses of the banking system but also on default risk premium and liquidity risk premium components. It has been argued 14 Dispersion is represented as the standard deviation of the variable of interest for the sample banks at each particular point in time. The correlation coefficient for a particular bank is defined as the average pairwise correlation between this bank and other banks.
15 In a study of 22 Asia-Pacific banks (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2010) , we found that the heterogeneities in both PDs and correlations significantly reduce the systemic risk, which is consistent with the fact that Asia-Pacific banks are much more diverse than their US counterparts.
that, during the crisis period, the risk premium component could be the dominant factor in determining the CDS spreads (see, e.g., Kim, Loretan, and Remolona, 2009) . Given that the systemic risk indicator is based on risk-neutral measures, an interesting question is how much of its movement is attributable to the change in the "pure" credit quality (or actual potential default loss) of the banks and how much are driven by market sentiments (change in risk attitude, market panic, etc.) or liquidity shortage.
We run a regression analysis that examines the impact of actual default rates and risk premium factors on the systemic risk indicator. In Table 3 , objective default risk (or actual default rates) is measured by average EDFs of sample banks, the default risk premium in the global market is proxied by the difference between Baa-and Aaa-rated corporate bond spreads (see, e.g., Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2008) , and the liquidity risk premium is proxied by the LIBOR-OIS spread (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009 ). Individually (regressions 1 to 3), each of the three factors has a significant impact on the systemic risk indicator with an expected positive sign. In particular, one percentage increase in real default probability, default risk premium, and liquidity risk premium will translate into 1.93, 3.07, and 2.52 percentage increase in the systemic risk indicator. Default or credit risk premium has the highest univariate R-square of 76 percent. The last regression includes all three factors, which remain statistically significant, and jointly these driving factors seem to explain 87 percent of aggregate systemic risk variations. our sample period, it was mainly the actual default risk that contributed to riskiness of the banking system. Overall, the decomposition results provide strong evidence that systemic risk in the US banking sector stemmed not only from a belated reassessment of real default risk but also from an early repricing of credit risk and a sudden dry-up in market liquidity.
Marginal Contribution to Systemic Risk
The most relevant question is the sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., which banks are systemically more important or contribute the most to the increased vulnerability? Our identification of systemically important institutions can be contrasted with other market based systemic risk measures (e.g., CoVaR and MES) and with confidential supervisory information (e.g., SCAP result). In addition, our measures of institutions' systemic importance change noticeably over time, especially during the financial crisis, and as such can provide important monitoring tools for the market-based macroprudential or financial stability regulation.
Using the methodology described in Section 2, we calculate the marginal contributions of SCAP result), and December 2009 (end of sample). It is clear that size is the dominant factor in determining the relative importance of each bank's systemic risk contribution, but size doesn't change significantly over the time, at least within a reporting quarter. The obvious time-variation in the marginal contributions are mostly driven by the risk-neutral default probability and equity return correlation. In essence, the systemic importance of each institution is nonlinearly determined by size, default probability, and asset correlation of all institutions in the portfolio. Table 5 examines the determinants of marginal contribution to the systemic risk for each bank, using an OLS regression on the panel data. To control for bias, we use clustered standard errors grouped by banks as suggested by Peterson (2009) . The first regression shows that weight, or the size effect, is the primary factor in determining marginal contributions both in level and in relative terms. This is not surprising, given the conventional "toobig-to-fail" concern and the fact that bigger banks often have stronger inter-linkage with the rest of the banking system. Default probabilities also matter, but to a lesser extent and the significance disappears in the relative-term regression.
17 This supports the view for distinguishing between micro-and macroprudential perspectives of banking regulation, i.e., the failure of individual banks does not necessarily contribute to the increase in systemic risk. The second and third regressions suggest that there are significant interactive effects.
Adding interactive terms between size and PD or correlation have additional and significant explanatory power. Overall, the results suggest that the marginal contribution is the highest for high-weight (hence large) banks which observe increases in PDs or correlations.
Alternative Systemic Risk Measures and Policy Implication
As discussed earlier in Section 2, our marginal contribution measure is an alternative measure related to the CoVaR measure suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) and the MES measure suggested by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) . The most important difference is that our distress insurance premium (DIP) based measure of each bank's systemic importance is a risk-neutral pricing measure that is derived from both CDS and equity market data, while CoVaR and MES are objective distribution based statistical measures that rely only on equity return information. Another important difference is that DIP and MES measure each bank's loss conditional on the system being in distress, while the CoVaR measures the system losses conditioning on each bank being in distress. Finally, both CoVaR and MES ideas only implicitly take into account of size, PD, and correlation of each bank; while for our DIP measure, these characteristics are direct inputs into our systemic risk indicator. 
19
Note that our systemic risk measure is a risk-neutral concept, while SCAP and MES
18 SCAP or stress test is a leading example of combining both macroprudential and microprudential perspectives in banking supervision and regulation (see, e.g., Hirtle, Schuermann, and Stiroh, 2009; International Monetary Fund, 2010) .
19 We obtain the MES data from NYU Stern Volatility Lab at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk, and the CoVaR data are kindly provided by Tobias Adrian. We flipped the signs of CoVaR measures so that the higher the CoVaR, the higher the bank contributes to the systemic risk. This is consistent with other measures in the comparative study.
is based on statistical expected loss; consequently MES is supposed to have a stronger connection with SCAP than DIP. Although CoVaR is also a statistical measure, it measures the system's loss conditional on each bank in stress; while MES and DIP measure each bank's loss conditional on the system in stress, yet SCAP measures each bank's loss conditional on the macroeconomy in stress. Also, the tail percentile value (like CoVaR) and tail expected value (like MES or SCAP) can diverge significantly in heavy tailed distributions. These differences in conditioning directions and tail measures may explain the notable differences in rankings of DIP, MES, and CoVaR versus SCAP.
20
The nonlinear effect documented in Table 5 is more visible in a hypothetical calibration exercise examining the relationship between our systemic risk indicator and institution's size (total liability), (risk-neutral) default probability, and (average) historical correlation ( Figure   6 ).
21 The relationship looks roughly linear for default probability, but highly nonlinear with respect to size and to a lessor degree to correlation. In fact, when the bank size is bellow 10 percent of the total portfolio, the slope of systemic importance with respect to size is very flat; but when the size is beyond 10 percent, the contribution to systemic risk shoots up almost vertically. An intuitive reason is that, when a bank is too big, its failure is considered as a systemic failure by definition. This may indicate a desirable maximum size of the large complex financial institutions (LCFI), for a societal benefit of limiting the systemic risk. The relationship between systemic importance and correlation shows a similar nonlinear pattern but is less dramatic. In other words, systemic importance is a joint effect of an institution's size, leverage, and concentration and is highly nonlinear in nature.
Our finding of the dominant effect of bank size and its pronounced nonlinear impact on bank's systemic risk contribution has important policy implications. In particular, the financial regulation reform bill recently enacted by United States Congress (2010) explicitly 20 The ex post weighting of MES and CoVaR measures by sizes can raise a question on how to interpret the resulting absolute magnitudes. As shown by the y-axes in Figure 5 , the tier 1 capital weighted MES has a scale of 6 billion USD, and CoVaR translated to dollar term of 2,000 billion USD. In comparison, both SCAP and DIP range to 150 billion USD. 
Concluding remarks
The recent financial crisis has caused policymakers to reconsider the institutional framework for overseeing the stability of their financial systems. A series of reform recommendations have been made covering various aspects of financial regulation and supervision. It has become generally accepted that the traditional microprudential or firm-level approach to financial stability needs to be complemented with a system-wide macroprudential approach, i.e., to pay greater attention to individual institutions that are systemically important.
In this paper we advocate a methodology to measure the systemic importance of individual banks and their marginal contribution to a distressed insurance premium. We apply this methodology to the 19 banks covered by the SCAP or stress test program. Our results suggest that the elevated systemic risk in the banking sector is initially driven by the rising default risk premium and later by heightened liquidity risk premium. But since the fourth quarter of 2008, both real default risk and risk premia are rising as the financial crisis turned into a severe economic recession. A decomposition analysis shows that the marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk is mostly determined by its size, or the "too big to fail" doctrine, although correlation and default probability also matter. Finally, our measure of systemic importance of banks -as a market based risk-neutral priceshows clear association and meaning difference with the estimated SCAP loss as an objective statistical measure.
Our approach can be extended to address important policy questions. For one, the marginal contribution measures and its desirable additive property implies that it is straightforward to design regulatory requirements based on individual banks' systemic importance.
Such regulatory requirement can be capital surcharges, or individual banks' contribution to a banking tax or a systemic risk insurance fund. Moreover, our finding of the pronounced nonlinear relationship between a bank's systemic risk contribution and its liability size lends indirect support for the Volcker's 10 percent concentration limit adopted in the recent financial regulation reform legislation. Second, although the proposed DIP measure is risk-neutral, the framework can be easily extended by substituting key inputs with the regulator's confidential information or other input variables for the purpose of policy analysis. For instance, one can replace the risk-neutral PDs in our framework with objective measures of PDs 22 and calculate the distress insurance premium on an incurred-cost basis. This objective measure, by filtering out the risk premium components, can provide useful complimentary information for supervisors.
22 The Expected Default Frequency (EDF) is one such product that produces objective measures of expected default rates of individual firms. However, it is widely acknowledged that EDFs for financial firms are less reliable, mainly because financial firms typically have much higher leverages than corporate firms. The higher leverage does not necessarily reflect higher default risk but will cause substantial bias in EDF estimates without proper adjustment, which remains a challenging task. Notes: The dependent variable is the marginal contribution of each bank to the systemic risk indicator, which is represented in level terms (unit cost of insurance, in basis point) in the first panel and in relative terms (as a percentage of total insurance premium) in the second panel. Explanatory variables include PDs, bank-specific correlations (average of pairwise correlations between one bank and all others) and weights of individual banks and interactive terms. Similarly, PDs and correlations refer to level terms in the first panel and relative terms (the ratio over cross-sectional averages) in the second panel. OLS regression is adopted and t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis, using clustered standard errors grouped by banks. Notes: This graph compares three systemic risk measures, distressed insurance premium (DIP) proposed by this paper, marginal expected shortfall (MES by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010) weighted by bank's tier-1 capital, and conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009) 
